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engage in class struggle, neoliberal austerity imposed by
the state will continue.
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Introduction
On February 22nd West Virginia public school teachers went on a wildcat strike
for raises and maintaining their health benefits.(Elk 2018b) The strike lasted 9 school
days and ended up with the all school employees winning a 5% raise.(Associated Press
2018) The victory of West Virginia teachers inspired teachers in states like Oklahoma
and Arizona. In Oklahoma, the teachers went on strike on April 2nd even though they
had received a $6,000 raise just days before. They demanded a $10,000 raise and
more funding for their schools.(Elk 2018a) In Kentucky, teachers called a sickout on
March 30th then rallied to the state capitol on April 2nd as Kentucky governor vetoed
a bill that would increase per pupil funding the week before(McLaren and Costello
2018). He also signed a pension reform bill in February that was widely unpopular
with the teachers as it made teacher pensions more like 401(k) plans. The wave of
strikes eventually spread to blue states in Denver, Chicago, Oakland and LA
(DiMaggio and DeManuelle-Hall 2019).
In the light of the new wave of teacher strikes, I aim to provide a theoretical
understanding of the decline in the state of public education and teachers’ work
standards to explain the current wave of radicalization among teachers. To do this, I
will attempt to provide a basic theoretical groundwork for understanding the state
actors, capitalist crises and their relation to the state, as well as the state’s role in
determining the quality and the quantity of public services. In capitalist economies,
the state is responsible for a variety of tasks that include providing infrastructure
individual capitalists cannot develop on their own, legitimizing the existing relations
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of production and reproducing the capitalist social relations through reinforcing
property relations. These tasks are performed by various branches of the government,
and institutions that are run by these branches. Through class struggle, workers can
influence state policies and increase the state’s influence in the economy. However,
this rarely happens on the terms of the workers. The expansion of public education
has been a result of many struggles; but too often, as struggles die out, the gains that
came through them began to be undermined by dynamics of capital accumulation.
Class struggle is one of the many factors that influence state policies. But even then,
the main determinants of state policies remain to be the necessities of maintaining a
level of capitalist production and the capitalist social order. Only through obstructing
the reproduction of capitalism can the workers gain concessions from the state.
In the first section of this paper I will provide an overview of state theory and
discuss the constraints under which the state actors come up with policies. Second
section will focus on aggregate profitability as a factor that determines the actions of
capitalists and state actors alike. It will also discuss the origins of neoliberalism and
how it shaped the policies that followed the Great Recession. Third section will
elaborate the influence of structural constraints on the actions of state actors through
showing empirically which actions or inactions have led to the decline in the quality
of education and teachers’ pay. It will give an overview of state and financing of
education, taxation, and spending. Finally, the last section will look at the history of
teacher strikes and their relationship to the state. I will conclude by summarizing the
relationship between the state, profitability and teacher strikes in the public sector.
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The State
To explain the current crisis in public schools, we need a better understanding
of the relationship between the state actors and the capitalist class. Historically, the
state is capitalist due to the nature of its development, but its actions often contradict
the interests of the capitalist class. There are four major theories of the capitalist
state that try to explain the contradiction between the state’s capitalist nature and
pro-worker reforms sometimes pursued by the state in the past.
First is the ‘instrumentalist’ view which argues that the state is the instrument
of a class-conscious vanguard of the capitalist class. This view stems from the earlier
and more polemical works of Marx and was prominent among second and third
international Marxists (Miliband 1969). In the Communist Manifesto, Marx claims
“The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common
affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx 1888) Today, even among Marxists this view
is hard to maintain uncritically, given that the state provides many material benefits
to the working class today.
One of the more recent iterations of this view that aims to grapple with this
contradiction comes from the scholars of ‘corporate liberalism’ (Skocpol 2016). These
writers argue that the New Deal was the consequence of a conscious pursuit of longterm interests among the vanguard of the capitalist class. For this view to hold,
however, there must be a class-conscious vanguard of the capitalist class, who can
pursue both the short-term and the long-term interests of the capitalist class. Skocpol
argues that this was simply not true at the time, as most capitalists were in intense
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competition with one another (Ibid: 164) The intense and continuous competition
between capitalists contradicts the main premises of this view.
The second view is the ‘structural functionalist’ view. Proponents of this view
argue that state’s objective function is to maintain continuous reproduction of
capitalism (Poulantzas 1969). Hence, the capitalist class does not need to exert direct
pressure on the state for the state to pursue pro-capitalist policies. As a result, the
state has relative autonomy from the capitalist class, which enables it to pursue
policies that might contradict the short-term interests of an individual capitalist, but
also enables the reproduction of capitalism in the long run. This account suggests
that it is not the vanguard of the capitalist class, but the state that is conscious of the
long-term interests of the capitalist class. Functionalists run into a similar problem
as the instrumentalists by assuming the state, instead of the vanguard of the
capitalist class, is conscious of the long-term policies required for capitalist social
reproduction. In this scenario, however, if individual capitalists become conscious of
their own long-run interest, and their interests are contradicted by the state policies,
then the relative autonomy of the state would be very limited since capitalists would
try to exert direct pressure on the state (Block 1987: 53). Hence, much like the first
view the dynamics of competition would overwhelm a coherent unified long-term
strategy.
The third view is the ‘state autonomist’ view which proposes that the state has
complete, or near-complete, autonomy from class relations, and this autonomy
enables it to shape class relations. The main limitations on the state are those
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imposed by “national administrative arrangements, governmental institutions, and
political parties” (Skocpol 2016: 201). The policies are neither determined by
capitalists, nor by the workers. They are determined by the state managers, whose
insulated social status enables them to shape the terrain of conflict between workers
and capitalists. Skocpol, for example argues that it was the legalization of the right
to collective bargain that caused the mass wave of unionizations in 1933-35. This view
however undermines the agency of the working class by assuming the working class’s
relationship to the state is what determines its willingness to engage in class
struggle.‡ As much as the particularities of state policy are determined by those who
actually pass the legislation, the horizons of the policies the state managers are
shaped by the balance of class forces.
Finally, the fourth view is what I will refer to as the ‘class struggle’ view, which
is the view that will be explored most in depth as it appears the most applicable for
the purposes of this paper. The foundations of this view are developed by Fred Block
in the Ruling Class Does Not Rule (Block 1987). For Block, while capitalists are
conscious of their (short term) interests, they are not fully conscious of what is
necessary to reproduce the existing (political and economic) social order. State actors,
on the other hand, are forced to figure out how to reproduce the existing social order.
Hence, Block agrees with Poulantzas that the managers of the state have a broader
understanding of society than the capitalists, but he contends that their
understanding is still short of a complete knowledge of the necessities of reproducing

See (Goldfield and Melcher 2019) for a critique of state autonomist interpretation of New Deal
historiography.
‡
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the existing order. One factor of this lack of understanding on the part of the state
managers could be their struggle to maintain political power and the distortions this
causes in their understanding. For example, state actors often must react to
immediate crises to remain in power but sometimes their reactions might lead to
bigger crises and disrupt the reproduction of the social order. But if neither the ruling
class nor its representatives have a complete understanding of the necessities of
preserving and reproducing capitalist social relations then how does the state manage
to do just that? Block claims that there are two subsidiary structural mechanisms
and two major structural mechanisms that force the state actors to act in the general
interests of the capitalists and preserve capitalist social relations.
The first subsidiary mechanism is the direct ways by which the bourgeois
influences the state apparatus. Since we have established that capitalists are at least
aware of their short-term interests, they are also aware of the impact the state
apparatus has on those interests. Thus, capitalists act to put pressure on the state,
in pursuit of their interests, through direct means such as campaign contributions,
lobbying activities and favors to politicians and civil servants. Oftentimes, capitalists
will actively participate in private policy making groups that have powerful impact
on formulation of government policies, although these are likely to diverge from the
unengaged ruling class opinion. But even in the instances where members of the
ruling class do not directly engage in these groups, those from other classes fill this
role as their representatives. An example to this mechanism can be seen in the
charter school movement, where the likes of Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Chan
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Zuckerberg Initiative and the Walton Family have campaigned for privately run
public schools (Charter School Growth Fund 2017b).
The second subsidiary mechanism is bourgeois cultural hegemony. Block
states that there are written and unwritten rules about what constitutes legitimate
state policy. An example to this could be the neoliberal ideology that has been, and
still is hegemonic among the ruling class and state actors. Neoliberalism promotes
austerity, tax cuts and financial deregulation. Neoliberal hegemony provided a
framework for many states and counties to underfund their public schools as we will
see in the following sections. Those that oppose the neoliberal consensus on these
policies have often been marginalized within the state apparatus.
The first major structural mechanism can be derived from the fact that all state
actors need to maintain some degree of economic activity to be able to maintain their
own power regardless of their political ideology. Firstly, because the financing of the
state apparatus is dependent on its tax revenues and borrowing, both of which depend
on the state of the economy. And secondly, public support for a regime will decline
sharply in the instances of high unemployment, low economic activity, and a shortage
of key goods. Even if public support is not significantly affected, it will make it more
challenging for state actors to maneuver other challenges and take effective actions.
The level of economic activity depends on private investment decisions made
by individual capitalists. Block states that this means that capitalists, as investors,
can essentially veto state policies since reducing their private investments can cause
major political crises for state managers. This discourages state managers from
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pursuing policies that might decrease the rate of investment. In fact, the investmentveto capitalists hold encourages state managers to pursue policies that would
increase private investments. This makes it more likely for the state actors to act in
the interest of capitalists. As we will see later, many states have reduced their tax
rates to increase private investments following the Great Recession.
In short, the state needs to maintain a level of ‘business confidence’. Capitalists
decide on their level of investment based on such economic factors as wages, tax rates,
market size but also non-economic factors such as the type of government, political
stability. If capitalists believe that the tax rates are about to increase, they could
threaten state managers with reducing their rate of investment. Or, if they believe
that state managers are going to violate fundamental rules of the market, capitalists
could move their investments to different places where they can invest more freely.
The key point here is that ‘business confidence’ reflects the short-term interests of
the capitalists and the influence of their interests on the actions of state managers.
As a result, even when there is no direct pressure from capitalists, the state actors
need to maintain a degree of business confidence to maintain their own social power
and the state apparatus.
Yet one question remains: The state actions and policies that attempt to
maintain and increase business confidence often require an increase in the role of the
state in the economy. Why would capitalists give more power to state managers? This
is a result of our second major structural mechanism that determines the actions of
state managers, class struggle.
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Class struggle broadly has two main effects in determining capitalist
development and political-economic relations. First, through the struggle for higher
wages, class struggle pushes capitalists to develop the forces of production to replace
workers with machines and make production more ‘efficient’. Second, through the
struggle for improving living and working conditions often requires the state to act.
In the struggles to improve working and living conditions, the working class has
played an important role in the increased role of the state in capitalist countries.
These struggles pressured the state into imposing more regulations and providing
more services for working class people. Yet capitalists have also supported increased
state regulation, if not state spending, in cases where it would hurt their competitors
or to get government contracts. But the major factor in the growth of state
intervention in the economy has been working class struggle and the pursuit of state
managers to gain more power.
This is where we encounter the development of public education. Block states
that “workers have played an important role, for example, in demanding increased
public education” (Block 1987: 64) A glimpse at the history of public education in the
United States reveals that periods of its development and spread coincide with
periods of high levels of class struggle in the 1930s and 1960s. Within these periods
strikes and social movements were widespread. The expansion of public education, in
return, helped create an educated labor force that capitalist development required
but without class struggle the conditions under which public education expanded
would be undoubtably different.
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Although working class struggles can lead to an increase in state regulation
and services, we must not lose sight of the constraints under which the state
apparatus functions. Block states that; “working-class pressures, for example, might
lead to an expansion on educational resources available for the working class, but
there is every likelihood that the content of the education will be geared to the needs
of accumulation - the production of a docile workforce at an appropriate level of skill”
(Ibid). Oftentimes, after a working-class victory in one of these struggles, the
capitalist class will attempt to neutralize or destroy the gains through its influence
on the state apparatus, or the state managers might have to undo certain regulations
or cut spending during times of crisis. We have seen these types of policies take place
under neoliberal hegemony. Block states three main factors that state managers
must weigh at the times of popular struggles. First, the state managers do not want
to hurt business confidence. Second, they do not want to escalate class conflicts to a
level that would threaten their own rule. And third, they are aware that the expanded
role of the state will also grow their own power and resources.
To summarize this section, we have established that the capitalist class lacks
the class consciousness to influence the state in a unified manner and that there is a
division of labor between the capitalist class and its representatives in the state. Yet,
the state still acts in the interests of the capitalist class due to direct coercion,
capitalist cultural hegemony and its dependence on the level of investment capitalists
provide. We have also established that class struggle determines the actions and the
development of the state apparatus, but these remain within the confines of ; (1)
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maintaining “business confidence”, (2) the state managers’ interest in increasing
their own power and resources, and (3) lowering the level of class antagonisms to
maintain political stability. In relation to public education, we have stated that its
growth had been influenced by class struggle but also within the confines of the
capitalist interests and the interests of the state actors. Next sections will analyze
the economics the Great Recession, the state reaction against it, provide empirical
evidence to support some of the theses from this section and look at labor relations in
public education,.
The Crisis
There is evidence of teachers’ salaries eroding at least since the late
1960s.(Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel 2008) Although the current crisis of public
education is mostly a result of the Great Recession and the policies that followed it,
similar trends can be observed during past recessions as well. Therefore, to
understand these policies, we should have a more in depth look at what dynamics
caused the Great Recession and economic crises in general.
There are many theories that attempt to explain the dynamics of the Great
Recession. The most mainstream theories tend to assume that capitalism is capable
of continuously creating economic growth. Hence, most recessions are either
explained by shocks that are ‘exogeneous’ to the system, or by business cycle
‘adjustments’ (Shaikh 1978). More ‘heterodox’ theories emphasize the growth of the
financial sector and instability created by increased financialization. (Minsky 1992,
Stiglitz 2015). However, in economics rarely are recessions considered in the context
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of the long-term development of capitalism. This, in turn, often leads to misleading
conclusions about what happened and what is to be done next.
In the First Great Depression of the 21st century, Anwar Shaikh tries to explain
the causes of the Great Recession with the long-term movements in the profit rate of
enterprise. The profit rate of enterprise, in Shaikh’s essay, refers to the difference
between the rate of profit and the interest rate. Shaikh explains the enterprise rate
of profit in the following way:
The classical economists argued that it is the difference between the
profit rate (r) and the interest rate (i) which is central to accumulation.
The reason is that profit is the return to active investment, while the
interest rate is the return to passive investment. A given amount of
capital may be invested in producing or selling commodities, in lending
money, or in active speculation. The rate of profit in each case is its
return, fraught with all the risks, uncertainties and errors to which such
endeavors are subject. … On the other hand, the same amount of capital
could just as well be invested in a savings account or a safe bond, earning
interest in quiet and relative safety. The interest rate is the benchmark,
the safe alternative, to the rate of return on active investment. (Shaikh
2011)
Through observing the movements in this rate, Shaikh also elaborates how a similar
trend to the Great Recession played out in the great stagflation crisis of the 1970s. In
Figure 1, Shaikh displays the changes in the rate of profit before interest.
<Figure 1>
As we can see the rate of profit before interest started declining in mid-1960s
but stabilized after the 1970s. Shaikh explains this stabilization through two factors.
The first factor is an increase in exploitation. This means that workers became more
productive but this increase in their productivity was not reflected on their income.
Figure 2 shows the growing gap between income and productivity starting in 1982.
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In the case of teachers, this change will be reflected in a slow decline in pupil per
teacher ratio combined with a much sharper decline in teacher incomes as we will see
in the next section.
<Figure 2>
In Figure 2, Shaikh shows that if the relationship between real wages and
productivity continued at the same pace as the pre-1982 period, the gap between
wages and productivity would have been much lower. Shaikh credits the post-1982
trend on concerted attacks on labor in this period by capitalists and claims that this
has helped the profit rate recover. In Figure 3, we can see the existing and
counterfactual trends in the profit rate for if the wages had kept up with the increases
in productivity.
<Figure 3>
As we can see, the capitalist attacks on labor helped the rate of profit stabilize
to some extent since the 1980s. The second factor that stabilized profitability was the
interest rate. Since profit rate of enterprise is defined to be the difference between
the profit rate and the interest rate, the changes in interest rate influences
investment decisions significantly. Figure 4 shows the long-term trends in the
interest rate.
<Figure 4>
From 1947 to 1981, the interest rate increased from 0.59% to 14.03%. After
1981, it had dropped just as drastically to 0.16% in 2009. Figure 5 shows the combined
effects of the drop of the interest rate and the increase in exploitation. These two
13

factors help explain the recovery from the stagflation crisis and the long boom that
lasted until the 2009 crisis.
<Figure 5>
As we can see in Figure 5, the profit rate of enterprise recovered from 1982
until 2009, although still having two downturns which coincide with the two
recessions that happened in the late 1980s and early 2000s. Shaikh’s theory also
explains why the boom that took place since 1982 was inherently contradictory. As
work became more exploitative and interest rates went down, household debts
increased significantly. Figure 6 shows the increase in debt to income ratio for the
given period.
<Figure 6>
As household debt soared and wages stagnated, people could no longer pay
back their debt, and this has led to a drop in the rate of profit of enterprise and
triggered the Great Recession. The main takeaway from this section is the
relationship between the previously mentioned “business confidence”, the rate of
profit and its effects on working-class people when the level of class struggle is low.
As the rate of profit declined in the 1970s, state actors and capitalists alike were
forced to act to recover profitability. They did this through concerted attacks on labor,
deunionization and changes in the labor law. Figures 7 and 8 show the sharp decline
in rates of union membership and ratio of workers represented by unions since the
1980s.
<Figure 7>
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<Figure 8>
One policy Shaikh does not mention is the complete reconstruction of the US
tax code and the rhetoric of taxation in the 1980s. In 1981, US top individual income
tax rates dropped from 70% to 50%. By the end of the 1980s this rate dropped to 33%
(Frankel 2017c). For our purposes, as it will be discussed in the next section, federal
income taxes are not the most relevant factor in public education, but it is important
to understand the shift in tax policies, their impact on what constitutes a ‘legitimate
policy’, and how states followed suit with the federal government which led to similar
consequences at the times of crisis. Tax cuts have been one of the main policies the
state actors used to promote ‘business confidence’ in the last few decades. As a result
of this, federal corporate income tax rates have also been lowered in the last few
decades as Figure 9 shows (Trading Economics 2020a). As the federal government
has been cutting taxes consistently, public debt has soared and became a large
justification for austerity. Figure 10 shows the increase in US government debt since
the 1950s (Trading Economics 2020b).
<Figure 9>
<Figure 10>
The next section will discuss the general state of public education in the United
States and what has led to the current crisis will be explained in the context of
concepts explored. The final section will look at the crisis from the point of view of the
teachers and their relationship to the public education system.
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The State of Public Education
It is quite easy to paint various pictures about the state of public education in
the US based on available data. For example, we can see in Figure 11 that the United
States is among the countries that have the highest per pupil spending on education
(OECD 2019). Or we could observe in Figure 12 that the per pupil spending in the
United States had been increasing consistently for most of the last century (NEA
2016).
<Figure 11>
<Figure 12>
These overall figures mystify the large disparities that exist in public
education in the United States. A closer look at per pupil spending across states
reveals an entirely different picture. In Figure 13, we can see the various trends
displayed by all the states (Ibid). While all states display an increase in per pupil
spending over the last 50 years, the degrees by which per pupil spending has
increased vary largely across states. Some states have much lower per-pupil spending
levels than others. We can also see periodic declines and stagnations at the level of
public spending, including one such period since the Great Recession. The main
reason for this is the way education is funded in the United States. Unlike many other
countries, in the United States, majority of the funding for public schools come from
the state and local taxes. Figure 14 shows how US public schools have been funded
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since 2000 (NCES 2020). A more in depth look at how each state funds their public
schools could be found in Figure 15 (Ibid).
<Figure 14>
<Figure 15>
The overreliance on local and state spending in public education leads to
extreme disparities both across and within states. A study by Bruce D. Baker, Mark
Weber, Ajay Srikanth, Robert Kim and Michael Atzbi includes the following map
which displays the disparities that exist in education spending in the United States
(Baker et al. 2018). The map displays the states that are below the required funding
levels to reach average national education outcomes in red and those that are above
in green. We can observe that the states in the southeast and the southwest are
significantly below the required funding levels reach national averages in education
outcomes.
<Map 1>
To understand these disparities and relate it to the current crisis, we need to have a
closer look at state and local government spending and revenues. A study by the
Urban Institute shows how state and local government revenues have been used
nationally over time (Urban Institute 2015). We can see in Figure 16 that spending
on public education from local and state governments have been declining while
spending on public welfare has been increasing at least since the Great Recession.
This is partly because of the drastic increases in healthcare costs in the United States
as well as the increased dependency on welfare since the Great Recession as the
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employment rates declined. In Figure 17, we can see that in 2015 only 0.5% of state
spending went to K-12 schools while 40% of local government spending went to K-12
schools.
<Figure 16>
<Figure 17>
As we have mentioned in the previous section, the Great Recession was a result of
the decline in profitability. As profitability declined, state revenues also declined due
to lower investments, lower incomes, and lower levels of employment. As of 2017, 16
states are still below the amount of tax revenues they reported prior to the recession
(Rosewicz and Newman 2018). Figure 18 shows the tax revenues of states in
comparison to their revenues prior to the recession.
<Figure 18>
While tax revenues stagnated or declined, healthcare costs were increasing.
Because of this and lower levels of employment, more and more people became
dependent on Medicaid. Medicaid and CHIP enrollment have increased nationally
from 56,533,472 people in 2013 to 73,910,380 in 2018.(Bloom 2017) This was a result
of the average health expenses increasing from $7,700 per year in 2007 to $10,345 in
2016. As a result, the amount of state money left to spend on education declined.
Figure 19 shows the sharp drop in per pupil state education spending (Leachman,
Masterson, and Figueroa 2017a). Figure 20 shows state by state declines in per pupil
funding. As we can see Arizona, Oklahoma and Kentucky are among the states whose
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per pupil spending have declined while West Virginia’s per pupil spending only
increased by 3.6% between 2008 and 2015.
<Figure 19>
<Figure 20>
Lower state revenues and higher state costs have pushed state managers to
lower in teachers’ salaries and benefits. According to estimates by the National
Education Association, adjusted for inflation, average teacher salaries in the United
States have declined from $60,778 in 2003 to $58,950 in 2016.(Chang 2018) For the
states that have lost large sums of state funding the teacher salaries remain
significantly lower than the national average. In Oklahoma teacher salaries went
from $45,579 in 2003 to $45,245 in 2016, while in West Virginia they went from
$49,999 to $45,701. Teachers in Arizona saw one of the largest drops from $54,396 to
$47,403. As of 2015, teachers make 23% less than other college graduates (Allegretto
and Mishel 2016). The wage gap between public teachers and similar workers grew
from 5.5% in 1979 to 17% in 2015. If we adjust for teachers’ compensation through
benefits, this gap remains at 11%. In no state teachers make more than other college
graduates. Table 1 shows the ratio of teacher salaries to other college graduate
salaries state by state.
<Table 1>
So far, we have shown that because of the drop in the rate of profit there have
been lower levels of investments. The lower levels of investments made state budgets
shrink significantly. Because of this, states cut their spending in K-12 public
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education. This led to a decline in per pupil spending and sped up the decline that
was already taking place in teachers’ salaries. As we can see, under the cases of
external economic pressure, state actors are forced, and do not hesitate to remove
what are essential services for working class people. But some states went even
further. To recover profitability in their states, 7 of the 12 states with the most
significant drops in K-12 spending have also lowered their individual or corporate tax
rates.(Leachman et al. 2017a) North Carolina reduced their top marginal individual
tax rate by 1.95%, while teachers’ salaries declined from $56,174 in 2003 to $49,837
in 2016 and as their per pupil state spending declined by 12.2% between 2008 and
2018. Kansas reduced theirs by 1.65% (Tax Foundation.org 2013), while teachers’
salaries declined by $4,272 between 2009 and 2016. Figure 21 shows the states that
have also cut taxes while their schools were already receiving less funding then
before.(Leachman et al. 2017a)
<Figure 21>
The goal of this section has been to provide empirical evidence for the state
actions that have led to decreasing public education quality and teachers’ salaries.
Since the recession, most states have lower spending dedicated to public schools. This
was a result of state actors’ decision to cut public spending – and in some states even
cut taxes, to recover profitability in their states. Cuts in public spending and taxes
became standard tactics among policy makers since the 1980s, and the policies that
have followed the Great Recession have only been a new wave of this trend. As a
result, jobs in education have declined by 135,000 and capital spending in K-12 public
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schools are more than 25% lower than their 2008 levels, while student enrollment
increased by 1,419,000 between 2008 and 2017 (Ibid). In short, the rate of exploitation
increased significantly in public schools as teachers had to educate a larger number
of students with a smaller quantity of resources. In the next section, we will explore
the process of radicalization among teachers in the face of these circumstances.
Teacher Revolts: Then and Now
Although it might be surprising based on what we discussed so far, throughout
the early twentieth century teaching was considered a ‘profession’, almost on par with
law and medicine in terms of its social status (Cole 1969). For this reason, the
organizations of teachers like the National Education Association and the American
Federation of Teachers modeled themselves after the likes of the American Bar
Association and American Medical Association. NEA opposed the unionization of
teachers, and both NEA and AFT had no-strike policies until the 1960s as they
believed this would degrade the teaching profession. Hence the earlier waves of
unionization and protests among teachers were driven largely by the attempts to
maintain or expand the professional integrity of the profession. Because of this
millions of teachers, most of whom taught in public schools, were excluded from the
collective bargaining provisions of NLRA alongside the rest of the public sector
workers as teachers largely sat out the strike waves of the 1930s (Shelton 2017:6).
Until the late-1950s-early-1960s, there was little strike activity among
teachers with the exception of a handful of communist led locals during the Great
Depression(Ibid:11-12), and a few AFL-Locals in mid-1940s before Taft-Hartley as
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teacher wages declined in the face of post-war inflation (Cole 1969: 14). Up to this
point, American Federation of Teachers was largely left alone by the national AFL
leadership, as the AFT was perceived to be more of a professional association.
Meanwhile the NEA maintained its commitment to opposing strikes while it
remained the largest teacher’s union in the country. However, a wave of strikes that
began with the New York night schoolteachers strike in 1959 pushed for collective
bargaining rights among public school teachers and helped change the no-strike
stance of prominent teacher unions. As these strikes spread and began winning
collective bargaining rights, and as AFL membership declined in the late 1950s as
the number of factory workers declined due to automation (Ibid: 165), the AFL
leadership began to view organizing teachers as a way of increasing union
membership among the largely non-union white collar labor force. Hence, the AFL
began to aid these efforts among teachers which also challenged the NEA’s no strike
position. However, during this period, most state school boards used a ‘carrot-andstick’ approach where the legal recognition of collective bargaining rights came
alongside no-strike laws (Shelton 7).
Even as it was illegal for most public-school teachers to go on strike, another
wave of strikes emerged in the middle of the 1972-75 in reaction the ‘budget crisis’
created by the stagflation crisis. After the crisis,
The decimated tax base, continued loss of jobs, and
movement of wealth to the suburbs combined with
economic downturn and the higher salaries of city teachers
in the collective bargaining era to create massive budget
shortfalls. During the late 1960s, banking interests had
been willing to cover deficits with credit, but in the 1970s
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they increasingly moved to discipline cities with austerity
budgets that hurt both public employees and the urban
citizens who both relied on those services and had been
critical of the subpar versions that had existed before fiscal
crisis. (Ibid: 12)
Both the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and that of 2010s were caused by the same dynamic
of declining profitability and ‘business confidence’ which lowered tax revenues in
certain localities. Similarly, in both cases the economic burden of the budget shortfall
was shifted onto the shoulders of public sector employees by their state managers,
rather than the capitalists. The main difference between the two waves of strikes is
that the strikes began in the newly unionized urban school districts in the 1970s
which were hit the hardest due to the racialized nature of the budget cuts, but they
started in more rural southern states in the strike wave that began in 2018 (although
as I mentioned in the introduction, the strikes did eventually move to large urban
areas within the span of a few months).
The teachers’ demands in the mid-1970s strike wave were concerned with
inflation wage-adjustments, layoffs, and class sizes. In Philadelphia, where the wave
started in 1972:
The board of education’s contract offer in August 1972
seemed certain to provoke a strike. In addition to freezing
salaries, the proposal extended the teaching day and
eliminated over 500 jobs. Not only did teachers oppose the
cuts, but they also asked for enough new positions to
reduce class sizes and a 34 percent salary increase for all
teachers to offset the 7 percent inflation since the last
contract and the expectation of higher inflation when
Nixon lifted price controls. (Ibid: 84)
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In January 1973, after the second strike of Philadelphia teachers since August 1972,
Chicago teachers went on strike. “The CTU initially demanded a 10 percent pay
increase but quickly scaled it down to 2.5 percent; the salary increase was not as
important as averting the layoffs and larger class sizes” (Ibid 101). In St. Louis,
… by 1972, a skilled union craftsman without a high school
education working for the school district began with an
annual salary that was $3,000 higher than a first-year
teacher. Teachers believed that their level of education and
social status entitled them to be paid on par with or better
than
blue-collar
workers.
Without
exclusive
representation, two unions competed for the city’s
teachers—the slightly larger STLTU (Local 420) and the
St. Louis Teachers Association (SLTA–NEA). (Ibid: 105)
Around the same time as the Chicago strike “the two sides joined forces, threatening
a strike the next January unless the school board agreed to a collective-bargaining
election, hospitalization insurance, and a “substantial” midyear raise” (Ibid). Out of
these strikes, only St. Louis teachers did not have the legal recognition for collective
bargaining, however, the strikes would eventually spread to Detroit and New York
where the teachers also did not have the legal right to strike.
By the 2010s the working conditions and the quality of educational resources
had deteriorated to obscene levels in parts of the country as we described in the
previous section. Alongside wage demands, the teachers had to fight for additional
funding for the needs of their students. “Between 2008 and 2017, per-pupil
instructional funding was cut by 28 percent in Oklahoma and 14 percent in Arizona,
ranking them as the forty-sixth and forty-ninth lowest-funded states in 2017” (Blanc
2019) In spring 2018,
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Due to budget cuts, many districts in Arizona and
Oklahoma have been forced to reduce the school week to
four days... Class sizes are often enormous, while textbooks
are scarce and scandalously out of date. Innumerable arts,
language, and sports programs have been eliminated.
Broken desks, crumbling ceilings, chair shortages, and
rodent infestations have become normal. (Ibid)
Because of this funding demands for students were as central for striking teachers in
Oklahoma and Arizona as wage demands. Similarly, for West Virginia teachers,
salary demands were also secondary as “the movement arose primarily in response
to proposed changes to the state’s public health insurance plan, the Public Employees
Insurance Agency (PEIA)” (Ibid). As we mentioned in the last section, in the last
decade the rising health care expenses became a major part cost on states, hence also
a major target for austerity budgets.

As the strikes moved to blue states, the

demands included assistance for homeless students in Chicago (Maass 2019), and
“ending punitive disciplinary procedures that feed the “school to prison pipeline” and
do nothing to improve school climate, essential for safe schools” in LA (Weiner 2019).
It is important to note that the strikes in West Virginia, Oklahoma and Arizona
were all illegal. Although the initial wave of strikes in the 1960s, before the teachers
gained collective bargaining rights were illegal as well, these strikes took place in a
completely different atmosphere where strikes and union activity were widespread
across the country (Shierholz and Poydock 2020). On the other hand, when West
Virginia teachers went on strike in April 2018, the South had been marked by the
weakness of organized labor and the labor movement had been on retreat for decades.
As Eric Blanc puts it:
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To the surprise of all, this frontal challenge to austerity
and neoliberalism came in the form of illegal statewide
strikes in Republican “right to work” bastions. Since unions
in these states were relatively weak and collective
bargaining virtually nonexistent, the strikes took on an
unusually volcanic and unruly form. In an unprecedented
historical development, much of the organizing for these
actions took place in secret Facebook groups where
teachers could share their fears, hopes, personal stories,
and action proposals (as well as countless silly memes).
And with union officials reluctant to call for illegal mass
action, rank and filers stepped into the leadership vacuum
and filled it to the best of their abilities. (Ibid)
The uniqueness of the ‘Red State Revolt’ was not limited to this. The bottom-up model
of organizing, largely driven by the rank and file created a more democratic
environment where the rank and file could bypass the hesitant union leadership
through the strong social bonds that existed between them. As Blanc states;
Organizers and rank and filers endlessly insisted that it
was only by coming together across their myriad of divides
that school employees could achieve their demands. The
names of the Facebook organizing groups that launched
the walkouts are indicative: West Virginia Public
Employees United, Oklahoma Teachers United (OTU), and
Arizona Educators United (AEU). In West Virginia, the
page quickly became known simply as United. This
consistent emphasis reflects a basic fact about labor
struggles under capitalism: namely, that as atomized
individuals, workers are virtually powerless at work. Only
by joining together with our coworkers in common
organizations and actions are we able to assert ourselves
against management.
As these strikes were largely successful in winning many of their demands,
they also prove Block’s point about state’s behavior. The important lesson from both
the case of the 1960s-70s and the current wave of teacher strikes is that the state is
structurally inclined to pursue the interests of the capitalists by pursuing austerity
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in the times of crisis in order to recover ‘business confidence’. In both cases, however,
the active resistance of the working class is the only way to stop the imposition of
austerity, and to better the conditions of the working-class. Throughout the neoliberal
era, public sector unions have been hesitant to go on strike as the tides turned against
them both legally and politically (Shelton 2017:192-93). However, the successes of the
striking teachers in 2018-19 could mark a turning as more workers organize for power
from the bottom up and counter the structural tendencies of capitalism and the state.
A democratic workers movement still carries the most promising alternative
to politics of neoliberal austerity.
Conclusions
Unless we follow the example of striking teachers, the states will continue to
starve public schools and teachers and as a result the quality of education will
continue to decline. This paper discussed the decline in public schools through
explaining their relation to the state and the capitalist system. The first section has
focused on theories of the state and elaborated the political and economic constraints
under which state managers act. The second section explained the concept of
profitability and the neoliberal policies the state actors followed to recover
profitability after the stagflation crisis of the 1970s. The third section explained the
effects of falling profitability and investments on state budgets and empirically
showed the cuts in state funding for public education that were caused by these
factors. It has also shown that the low-tax and low-spending neoliberal orthodoxy
that was established following the stagflation crisis continued to influence policies in
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some of the states with largest cuts in public education. The final section briefly
discussed the history of public sector teacher strikes during the stagflation crisis and
since the Great Recession. To conclude I argue that unless class struggle in public
education continues to surge, we can expect to see the continuation of similar policies
as profitability continues to decline and state actors continue to pursue neoliberal
policies.
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Figures and Charts
Figure 1: Actual and Trend Rate of Profit, US Nonfinancial Corporations 1947-2010
Profit = Earnings Before Interest and Tax

Source: Shaikh(2011)
Figure 2: Hourly Real Wages and Productivity, US Business Sector 1947-2010(1992
= 100)

Source:Shaikh(2011)
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Figure 3: Actual and Counterfactual Rate of Profit of US Nonfinancial Corporations
1947-2009(Counterfactual path if real wages had continued on their postwar trend)

Source:Shaikh(2011)
Figure 4: The Rate of Interest (3 Mo. T-Bill), US 1947-2008

Source:Shaikh(2011)
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Figure 5: Rate of Profit-of-Enterprise: US Nonfinancial Corporations, 1947-2008

Source: Shaikh(2011)
Figure 6: Household Debt-to-Income Ratio

Source: Shaikh(2011)
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Figure 7: Percent of employed, Members of unions

Source: BLS
Figure 8: Percent of employed, Represented by unions

Source:BLS
Figure 9:US Federal Corporate Tax Rate
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Figure 10: US Government Debt

Figure 11: Primary to Post Secondary per pupil spending

Source:OECD
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Figure 12

Figure 13

Source: National Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 2016
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Figure 14

Source: NCES
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Figure 15
Sources for Revenue for Public Education 2016-2017
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Map1: Current spending as % of cost of achieving national average outcomes

Source: Baker et al(2015)
Figure 16
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Table 1
State

Ratio

State

Ratio

State

Ratio

State

Ratio

State

Ratio

AZ

62.83%

AL

71.79%

US

77.02%

OH

79.74%

MD

83.58%

CO

64.54%

TX

72.80%

ID

77.33%

IA

80.00%

DE

83.68%

NC

65.38%

WA

73.52%

OR

77.91%

LA

80.54%

CA

85.79%

NM

66.16%

KS

73.87%

NH

78.53%

NE

80.85%

NJ

86.51%

VA

66.87%

WV

74.62%

KY

78.76%

MA

81.61%

VT

86.59%

OK

66.98%

FL

74.64%

IL

78.97%

CT

82.05%

PA

87.05%

MO

67.81%

AR

74.81%

SC

79.16%

MN

82.29%

ND

88.18%

GA

69.25%

MS

74.84%

DC

79.20%

IN

82.45%

NY

91.26%

UT

70.31%

HI

76.36%

NV

79.37%

WI

82.55%

MT

91.66%

TN

70.69%

SD

76.38%

ME

79.72%

MI

82.69%

AK

93.84%

RI

95.77%

WY

98.62%

Source: Allegreto and Mishel 2016
Figure 21
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